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Commentaries
The War Powers Resolution After the
Libya Crisis
The Honorable Robert G. Torricellit
The U.S. raid on Libya in April, 1986, raised once again the
issue of presidential compliance with the War Powers Resolu-
tion1 and also the larger issue of the proper roles of the execu-
tive and legislative branches in making foreign policy.' Among
the questions that arose were the applicability of the War Pow-
ers Resolution to anti-terrorist operations, the nature of the
President's obligation to consult with Congress, and the consti-
tutional implications of an executive-legislative clash.
The War Powers Resolution was enacted in a triumph of
congressional power when the House and Senate overrode Presi-
dent Nixon's veto in 1973. At that time the changing obligations
of government and the changing nature of warfare had made the
war-making procedure embodied in the Constitution unwork-
able. Since 1973, the transition in warfare - not just to insur-
gency, but to terrorism - has called into question the utility of
the War Powers Resolution as well.
t Robert G. Torricelli, Democrat of New Jersey, is a member of the House of Repre-
sentatives Committee on Foreign Affairs.
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1. Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (1982 &
Supp. III 1985)). For a discussion of the War Powers Resolution, see HousE COMM. ON
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., THE WAR PowEs RESOLUTION (Comm. Print
1982); R. TURNER, THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: ITS IMPLEMENTATION IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE (1983).
2. For a discussion of Congress' reaction to the Libyan air strike, see N.Y. Times,
Apr. 23, at A23, col. 1; id., Apr. 23, A23, col. 2; Greenhouse, Bill Would Give Reagan a
Free Hand on Terror, N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, at A9, col. 5; Roberts, Lawmakers Say U.S.
Failed to Consult Them Properly, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, at A17, col. 1.
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PACE LAW REVIEW
I. Legislative History of the War Powers Resolution
The legislative (and political) history of the War Powers
Resolution is long and complicated. As early as 1969, dissatisfac-
tion with the conduct of the Vietnam War led the Senate to pass
a non-binding resolution, S. Res. 85,' which declared that a na-
tional military commitment could be made only "from affirma-
tive action taken by the legislative and executive branches...
by means of a treaty, statute, or concurrent resolution of both
houses ... specifically providing for such commitment.""
In 1970, the House passed H.R.J. Res. 1355,1 the first in a
series of congressional measures that urged the President to con-
sult with Congress before an unauthorized use of troops, and re-
quired him to report on his actions.6 It did not, however, give
Congress the ability to force troop withdrawals. H.R.J. Res.
1355 died in the Senate, as did a similar bill, H.R.J. Res. 1, in
1971.8 By 1972, the tables had turned. The Senate passed a bill,
S. 2956,' that included provisions for congressional termination
of United States military involvements. The contemporary
House version contained no such provision, and no compromise
between the two versions was reached in conference.10
The final passage and enactment of the War Powers Resolu-
tion was made possible in 1973 by a variety of circumstances.
The Vietnam War by then encompassed Laos and Cambodia.
President Nixon was increasingly weakened by the Watergate
scandal. In March of that year, a House Foreign Affairs subcom-
mittee began hearings on the issue. By May, the subcommittee
had approved H.R.J. Res. 542,11 the bill that survived amend-
ments, conference, and presidential veto to become law.
The subcommittee version stated that in the absence of a
declaration of war, congressional approval would be needed for
0
3. S. Res. 85, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
4. Id. at 1.
5. H.R.J. Res. 1355, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
6. H.R. REP. No. 1547, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3-5 (1970); H.R. REP. No. 1302, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1972).
7. H.R.J. Res. 1355, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3 (1970).
8. H.R. REP. No. 1302, 92d Cong., 2d Sess 2 (1972).
9. S. 2956, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1972).
10. H.R. REP. No. 1302, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1972).




the commitment of United States troops to hostilities for more
than 120 days. In addition, Congress would be able to shorten
the 120-day period by passage of a concurrent resolution. 12 The
full House Foreign Affairs Committee reported out essentially
the same language in June, 1973."3
In July, H.R.J. Res. 542 passed in the House of Representa-
tives. Floor amendments changed the committee version in two
principal ways: it deleted committee language that would have
applied the resolution to the current conflict, yet also deleted
language allowing the President to determine when an emer-
gency existed. 4
Meanwhile, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had
approved, in May, 1973, a bill which was stricter than the House
version. The measure, S. 440,15 enumerated several emergency
situations in which the President might enter United States
troops into hostilities without a congressional declaration of war.
It prohibited the continuation of any military actions after 30
days unless Congress had given its approval. The objections to
S. 440 came from Senators, including committee Chairman J.W.
Fulbright, who thought that the bill was not restrictive
enough - that the emergency powers granted the President
were certain to be abused.' 6 Despite these objections, the Senate
passed S. 440 virtually unchanged in July of 1973.17
Following House and Senate action, conferees from each
chamber compromised by agreeing to a 60-day deadline on com-
mitment of U.S. forces not authorized by Congress, except under
certain circumstances. The conferees also accepted language al-
lowing Congress to force withdrawal of U.S. forces by concurrent
resolution, even though there were doubts about the constitu-
tionality of this provision. 18 These doubts, of course, were jus-
tifed in light of the subsequent Chadha decision. 19 In that case
12. Id. at 4.
13. H.R. REP. No. 287, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
14. 119 CONG. REc. 24, 682-85 (1973).
15. S. 440, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
16. See S. REP. No. 220, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REc. 25,119 (1973).
17. S. 440, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 25119 (1973).
18. H.R. REP. No. 547, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). See also 119 CONG. REc. 25, 089-
90 (1973).
19. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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the Supreme Court held that a one-House legislative veto was
unconstitutional, and the Court's opinion also cast doubt on the
constitutionality of a two-House veto and other congressional re-
view procedures.2 0
The House and Senate approved the conference report in
early October, 1973. On October 24 of that year, President
Nixon vetoed the measure.2 Congress overrode the presidential
veto on November 7, 1973, and the measure became law without
the President's signature and over his strenuous objections.2 2
The War Powers Resolution was opposed, throughout the
debate, by a striking coalition of liberals and conservatives. The
latter, primarily Republicans, stressed the danger of limiting the
flexibility of the President to react to conflicts and also raised
questions of constitutionality. The liberals also used the consti-
tutional argument, but in a very different way. They maintained
that the President's authority granted in the Constitution was
already circumscribed, and that the Resolution would actually
increase the scope of his power. According to this line of reason-
ing, statutory presidential authority to commit troops without a
20. Id. In Chadha, the Court held that the one-House veto provision in the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act was unconstitutional. Id. at 959. The provision allowed ei-
ther the Senate or the House of Representatives to overrule the Attorney General's de-
termination that the deportation of an alien should be suspended. Id. at 924-25. The
Court determined that the one-House veto provision violated the bicameralism and pre-
sentment requirements of article I, section 7 of the United States Constitution.
Article I, section 7 provides that "[elvery Bill which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the Presi-
dent of the United States .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. Article I, section 7 also
provides that "[elvery Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Sen-
ate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjourn-
ment) shall be presented to the President of the United States . U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 7, cl. 2.
The Court determined that the action of the House of Representatives in exercising
its legislative veto and overruling the suspension of Chadha's deportation was a legisla-
tive function. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952. As such, the action should have been taken pur-
suant to the provisions of article I, i.e. passage by both the House of Representatives and
the Senate, and presentment to the President. Id. at 956-57.
The Court's focus on the presentment clause led to concern that a two-House legis-
lative veto would also be held unconstitutional. This concern also led to doubts about the
constitutionality of other actions, such as concurrent resolutions, which might be deemed
to be legislative in nature but which would not meet the presentment requirement of
article I.
21. H.R. Doc. No. 171, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
22. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555, 559-60 (1973).
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declaration of war gave the President more power than constitu-
tionally warranted.2
Of the fifteen House liberals who had voted against the War
Powers Resolution, eight switched sides at the last moment and
provided the margin necessary to override the President's veto.
The override margin was only four votes over the required two-
thirds majority, so the votes of the holdout liberals - or, more
aptly, strict constructionists - were key.2" In the Senate, sup-
port for the Resolution was stronger. President Nixon's hold
over Republican Senators was uncertain, and one of them, Jacob
Javits of New York, was a prime supporter of the legislation.2 5
H.R.J. Res. 542, in its final form, contained three central
provisions relating to presidential war-making power: restric-
tions, requirements for consultation, and requirements for re-
porting.2 The President was permitted to introduce U.S. armed
forces into hostilities or situations where hostilities might be im-
minent only pursuant to a declaration of war, specific statutory
authorizations, or a national emergency arising from an attack
on the United States or its territories, possessions, or armed
forces.2
The President was required to consult with Congress, in
every possible instance, before introducing U.S. armed forces
into hostilities or situations in which hostilities might be immi-
nent, and to continue such consultations so long as hostilities
continued. In the absence of a declaration of war, the President
was required to report to the Speaker of the House and Presi-
dent Pro Tempore of the Senate within forty-eight hours regard-
ing the circumstances, scope, and projected duration of
hostilities.2 8
The Resolution then goes on to provide active and passive
congressional impediments to the continuation of hostilities.
23. 119 CONG. REC. 36,176-79 (1973).
24. Yeas, 284; nays, 135; not voting, 14. 119 CONG. REc. 36,221-22 (1973).
25. Yeas, 75; nays, 18; not voting, 7. 119 CONG. REC. 36,198 (1973). See also, JAvrrs,
WHO MAKES WAR? (1973).
26. H.R.J. Res. 542, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
27. Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 2(c), 87 Stat. 555, 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C.
§ 1541(c) (1982)).





Within sixty days after submission of the President's report,
U.S. troops must be withdrawn unless Congress either declares
war or specifically authorizes the continued commitment of
troops. Congress may also, either before or after the end of the
sixty-day period, terminate, by concurrent resolution, the use of
U.S. armed forces.29
II. The Raid on Libya
In the 1980's, the need for absolute secrecy in planning
quick, limited military strikes has become paramount. A direct
conflict now exists between military utility and constitutional
checks and balances. While this dilemma has marked the entire
history of the republic - it is only in dictatorships that the Ex-
ecutive has complete freedom of action in foreign policy - the
increased speed of war-making ability and the breakdown of
traditional definitions of war have brought this issue into
sharper focus.
On April 14, 1986, U.S. warplanes attacked military installa-
tions in Libya. The attack followed a series of Libyan-directed
bombings in Western Europe that killed Americans and others.-"
It also followed an incident of the previous month in which U.S.
aircraft, challenged by Libyan forces in international waters that
Libya claimed, destroyed anti-aircraft missile sites in that
country.32
President Reagan invited fifteen congressional leaders to
discuss United States plans at approximately 4:00 p.m. on the
day of the attack. The planes were already airborne, and eventu-
ally reached their targets three hours later. The President subse-
quently submitted a report to Congress in accordance with the
War Powers Resolution.
The fifteen Representatives and Senators invited to the
White House briefing on the day of the attack were the Speaker
29. Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 5, 87 Stat 555, 556-57 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1544
(1982)).
30. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, at Al, col. 6.
31. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, at Al, col. 6; Gelb, U.S. Aides Think Libya was
Linked to at Least One Bombing Last Week, N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, at A8, col. 1; N.Y.
Times, Apr. 6, at Al, col. 5; id. Apr. 6, at Al, col. 6; id. Apr. 4, at Al, col. 6; id. Apr. 4, at
A8, col. 1.




of the House and President Pro Tempore of the Senate; the ma-
jority and minority leaders of the House and Senate; the House
majority whip; the chairman and ranking minority member of
the House and Senate Armed Services Committees; the chair-
man and ranking minority member of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee; the chairman and ranking minority member of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 8
As a result of the controversy surrounding the attack on
Libya, Senator Robert Byrd, then Senate minority leader, pro-
posed legislation that would have codified the question of which
Members of Congress would be required to be consulted regard-
ing prospective hostilities. One of the problems in persuading
presidential administrations to comply with the Resolution has
been its vague requirement to consult with "Congress" without
defining that requirement. Presidents were left free to decide
which Members of Congress to consult, since discussing immi-
nent hostilities with the entire membership of both Houses
would not be feasible for reasons of unwieldiness and the need
to preserve secrecy.
The Byrd proposal " would designate a permanent consulta-
tive body of the previously mentioned members, with the excep-
tion of the House majority whip and the addition of the chair-
man and ranking minority members of the House and Senate
Intelligence Committees. No legislation, however, can address
the main obstacle to compliance with the War Powers Resolu-
tion. It is not that presidents do not know with whom to consult.
It is that they would rather not consult.
III. Analysis
The Constitution gives Congress the power to declare war. 5
By designating the President as Commander in Chief, it implic-
itly gives the President the power to make war and to "repel
sudden attacks."" Until recent times, presidential dispatches of
U.S. troops to intervene in foreign countries met with little op-
33. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, at A10, col. 1; id., Apr. 15, at All, col. 1.
34. S.J. Res. 340, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.





position from Congress. Vietnam, of course, changed that. The
country found itself embroiled in a war that lasted for years, ap-
peared on the home television screens of millions of Americans,
and eventually lost popular support. What was lost in Vietnam
was faith in the President's competence to enter into war.
Of all the military actions in U.S. history, only five have
been wars declared by Congress. All others - excepting the
Civil War, which is a special case - were limited enough in du-
ration or expense so as not to incur widespread popular opposi-
tion. In the case of Vietnam, a substantial segment of the Ameri-
can people and their elected representatives came to the
conclusion that the war failed to meet the test of protecting ei-
ther the "'inchoate interests' and honor of the United States, or
the rights and property of American citizens abroad. '"37
The 1986 attack on Libya needs to be seen in the context of
the post-Vietnam congressional attitudes toward the presiden-
tial exercise of military force. In the period since 1973, and par-
ticularly in the Reagan administration, Congress had become far
more accommodating of presidential authority in military mat-
ters. This accomodation was shown, for instance, by the rela-
tively mild congressional reaction to the U.S. operation in Gre-
nada in 1983.
Several factors contributed to this trend. First, the Soviet
Union was perceived to be growing in military strength and to
be increasingly willing to challenge U.S. interests in the Third
World. The breakdown of detente in the 1970's and the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan both contributed to this perception.
Second, the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua, and the percep-
tion of Nicaragua as a Soviet satellite, created new fears about
the security of the United States right on its home turf. In this
atmosphere, the U.S. landing on Grenada and the overthrow of a
Soviet-allied regime evoked relatively little domestic outcry. The
muted reaction was also due to the Grenadan incursion's speed,
low price, and ease of victory.
The April attack on Libya was not, as in the case of Gre-
nada, undertaken for the stated purpose of safeguarding Ameri-
can lives in a direct sense. Rather, it was designed to deter and
preempt Libya from carrying out further attacks on American




citizens. The raid brought up questions in Congress about com-
pliance with the War Powers Resolution and spurred hearings of
the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the issue.
During the hearings on the compliance issue, State Depart-
ment Legal Advisor Abraham Sofaer took the position that both
the consultation and reporting requirements of the Resolution
had been met. He stated that "extensive consultations occurred
with congressional leaders. They were advised of the President's
intention after the operational deployments had commenced,
but hours before military action actually occurred."38
In fact, by the time congressional leaders were consulted,
the aircraft were already on their way to Libya. The President
presented a fait accompli, thus informing the legislators of his
decision rather than consulting with them.
Sofaer then went on to note that Congress had previously
instructed the Department of Defense about the duty of special
forces to protect United States citizens abroad and had author-
ized funds for that purpose.3 e In the controversy surrounding the
Libya attack, there was little question of the President's right to
engage in anti-terrorism operations. The April 14 operation,
however, involved not a special squad engaged to free American
hostages, but rather a large assemblage of regular military forces
to attack the regular military forces of another country.
The aftermath of the U.S. raid on Libya shows that Con-
gress, while concerned about protecting its prerogatives, will not
provoke a serious confrontation over questions of compliance
with the War Powers Resolution if it determines that the presi-
dential action was warranted. President Reagan's policy toward
Libya gained wide support in Congress and among the American
people. Few legislators were willing to object to the President's
actions on the ground of either procedure or substance. To the
contrary, many of the administration's critics maintained that
the United States had not been firm enough.
In the wake of the attack on Libya, legislation was intro-
38. War Powers, Libya, and State Sponsored Terrorism: Hearings Before the Sub-
committee on Arms Control, International Security and Science of the House Comm.
on Foreign Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1986) (statement of Abraham D. Sofaer,
Legal Advisor, Department of State).




duced in the House and Senate with the opposite intent of the
Byrd measure: to loosen the restrictions of the War Powers Res-
olution.'0 This bill, the Senate version of which was introduced
by Majority Leader Robert Dole, would authorize a President
"to undertake actions to protect United States persons against
terrorists and terrorist activity through the use of all such anti-
terrorism and counter-terrorism measures as he deems neces-
sary."' 1 The bill would also require the President to report to
Congress on his actions within ten days,42 rather than the forty-
eight hours mandated in the War Powers Resolution.
The War Powers Resolution remains valid regarding anti-
terrorist operations, not just conventional warfare. However, the
most effective application of the Resolution is for the purpose of
keeping the United States out of the kind of conflict from which
the legislation arose. It might be a good idea for legislators to
reserve their heaviest fire for circumstances closer to those on
which the framers of the Resolution based their formulations.
The introduction of U.S. ground troops near or into Nicaragua
might be one such case.
Congressional restraint on the Executive works best when
administration policies threaten to entangle the United States in
a drawn-out war with confused goals and little chance of success.
President Reagan has so far avoided a major confrontation with
Congress over the War Powers issue because he has drawn back
whenever a conflict became prolonged. The 1983 Beirut peace-
keeping misadventure can serve as a good example of this sort of
realism. The administration decided to withdraw the Marines
from Lebanon when it became clear that their presence only in-
flamed passions instead of calming them.
The U.S. encounters with Libya in March and April of 1986
did not threaten to involve the United States in a wider and
longer war. Soviet ties with Libya proved fairly superficial; there
was little danger that the U.S.S.R. would have come to Libya's
defense. In addition, the hostilities were confined to the air and
sea, thus avoiding the prospect of a deeper involvement that the
40. H.R. 4611, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); S. 2335, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). See
also N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, at A9, col. 5.
41. H.R. 4611, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4(b) (1986).




introduction of ground troops entails.
Already, Congress' ability to exercise a direct influence on
foreign and defense policy has been weakened by the march of
technology. When faced with an imminent nuclear attack, a
President would have no time to consult with Congress even if
he so desired. Congressional control of the budget is frequently
cited by the executive branch as evidence of Congress' influence
over military matters. Congressional power of the purse, how-
ever, influences long-term policy only, not decisions that have to
be made quickly.
The political reality of Washington is that Congress, for the
most part, prefers a President to take the lead on foreign policy.
So long as it agrees with presidential policy, Congress is unlikely
to step in, even when it is not consulted. Congress tends to fence
in a President only when it disagrees with both the substance
and method of presidential conduct.
The Framers of the Constitution, mindful of the abuses of
the British kings, sought to place limits on executive power
without damaging the degree of central government control
thought necessary in light of the poor record of government
under the Articles of Confederation. The dilemma of executive
expedience versus popular accountability has not changed that
much in two hundred years. What has changed is the margin of
error. Until World War II, a balance of power tipped in favor of
Congress would not have caused the nation serious damage. Se-
cure behind two oceans, the United States had a fairly large
margin of error in the conduct of foreign and military affairs.
Today, no such security exists.
Ronald Reagan and future Presidents will be able to pre-
vent statutory restrictions on their flexibility in foreign and mili-
tary policy only by including congressional leaders in major for-
eign policy decisions from the start. In the Libyan affair, the
administration escaped the extent of congressional wrath be-
cause of the consensus supporting the substance of the policy.
In the more recent case of arms shipments to Iran, which
became public knowledge in November, 1986, the administration
might not be so fortunate. Although not a War Powers issue, the
questions raised were the same. The President, by keeping Con-
gress in the dark about a policy with which its Members strongly




tivities. The depth of outrage in the Iranian case might even
lead Congress not simply to tighten reporting and consultation
requirements, but to demand greater oversight with respect to
presidential national security decision-making.
Clashes between the executive and legislative branches of
the U.S. government are natural, inevitable, and, to a certain ex-
tent, desirable. The Constitution has, until now, worked to as-
sure that neither branch has run unchecked.
I am skeptical about the possibilities that statutes alone will
resolve the conflicts between President and Congress on War
Powers issues and on questions of overall conduct of foreign pol-
icy. Presidents will always try to find ways to stay within the
letter of the consulting and reporting requirements without ced-
ing their prerogatives. For its part, Congress runs the risk of ty-
ing the President's hands by imposing too detailed restrictions;
the threat of such legislation, however, might be enough to con-
vince an administration to be more cooperative.
IV. Conclusion
The War Powers Resolution, even if it cannot be strictly en-
forced in every instance, will continue to be a necesssary device
to remind the executive branch of the need to work with Con-
gress in the formulation of foreign policy. The Resolution's pri-
mary purpose has been accomplished, both through its own
workings and through greater public and congressional aware-
ness. It is unlikely that future Presidents could involve the
United States in major hostilities without significant legislative
oversight, as was the case with Presidents Johnson and Nixon in
Indochina.
The War Powers Resolution cannot be viewed outside the
context of the overall balance between Congress and the Execu-
tive in national security affairs. When Congress feels that it is
part of policy formulation, and when a consensus has formed
around the issue, little will be said about observance of the letter
of the Resolution. When Congress feels excluded, however, it
will insist on compliance with its formal prerogatives.
Because of his enormous popularity, President Reagan has
until now been given a great deal of leeway in mapping U.S. mil-
itary interventions. Another factor in the popularity of the Pres-
ident's moves was the sentiment that the United States needed
[Vol. 7:661
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to recover from global setbacks suffered in the 1970's. In light of
the Iran arms scandal, President Reagan and his successors will
be called to account with greater frequency. The War Powers
Resolution, then, can be seen as a fallback. For future adminis-
trations that attempt to make military commitments without a
congressional consensus, it will remain potent.
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